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Abstract - SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data 
Acquisition) networks control much of the industrialised 
nations production and supply complexes. Various 
government reports and investigations have highlighted the 
vulnerability of these systems. Many of these systems are on 
private networks which are increasingly being connected to 
systems that are accessible from other networks such as the 
Internet. 
SCADA systems have unique security and operational 
requirements. However, many of the most basic security 
measures are missing in these networks. This examines 
some of these issues and proposes some technologies that 
could help secure these networks from attack.
Keywords: SCADA, infrastructure, countermeasures, open 
source, IDS, firewall, honeypots 
1 Introduction
Critical infrastructure is largely controlled by the use of 
automated control systems and in particular supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCADA 
systems are being identified in various Government reports 
and the media as systems that are increasingly  coming 
under attack [1-3].  The reports from various agencies rate 
SCADA systems as highly vulnerable to attack or 
compromise that would result in catastrophic failure of 
these systems.  
Many of these systems are used to run the modern industrial 
complexes that supply modern Western nations with many 
of the services and goods that they take for granted.  These 
systems are to be found in but not limited to: petroleum 
complexes, power generation grids, water supply networks, 
sewerage networks and most other complex systems that 
require constant computer-based monitoring or control.  
Failure or even disruption to these systems could have 
catastrophic consequences resulting in supply chain 
collapse, with resultant economic impacts and even loss of 
life directly or indirectly. As a recent example, disruption of 
gas services as a result of an industrial mishap in Western 
Australia alone in 2008 almost saw that States economy 
grind to a halt [4]. The loss of capacity at ~ 40% was 
sufficient to have considerable downstream effects that for 
instance caused laundry for hospitals to be shipped in from 
other Australian states until increased supplies of gas could 
be obtained. A cyber based attack that could disrupt supply 
in the same manner could have similar effects. 
SCADA/control devices and resultant systems are built to 
run, monitor or control a particular process, typically as a 
part of combined automated process that results in a 
product. Many of these devices and systems in which they 
operate are intended to run for the life of the project, life of 
an ore body in a mine, or product cycle which can be 
decades not weeks. As a result, SCADA systems have a 
larger than expected level of legacy hardware and software 
installed, the old engineering adage if it is not broken do not 
fix it, was and remains a meme in many of these systems. 
This modus operandi was a perfectly acceptable operational 
paradigm in which to operate when many of these 
companies/entities did not connect to any network except 
their own, and the production or engineering network was 
never connected to the corporate network that connected to 
the Internet. This status quo has now changed for a number 
of reasons, namely, the increasing ubiquity of the Internet 
and its associated technologies and protocols and 
interconnection with business processes. The drivers are not 
always technological: smaller companies merge and 
combine to become bigger entities, particularly as the 
pressure of globalisation and economic rationalisation 
increase. This trend leads toward network infrastructures 
that are often comprised of different and disjointed legacy 
network systems and infrastructures. Further adding to the 
entropy with respect to the security and technical stability, 
is the attachment to the corporate network and increasing 
use of Internet technologies such as http to reach into these 
SCADA and control networks. In addition, it is not 
uncommon to have a third party entity in charge of the 
SCADA network and systems, and possibly even an 
additional third party IT outsourcing company in charge of 
corporate networks. 
Many of the older SCADA and control systems were 
proprietary systems with protected protocols and processes. 
As a result, these systems had a reasonably high level of 
security through obscurity and limited knowledge of their 
design and operation. When these SCADA and control 
systems are upgraded, they are being moved to open 
platform systems that utilise open network protocols such 
as Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) or ModBUS, 
and increasingly, TCP/IP based control systems.   
Atypically, older systems infrastructures were controlled 
via tied lines or privately controlled proprietary wired or 
proprietary wireless networks. New generation SCADA and 
control systems also use modern open standard 
communications networks to provide access to the SCADA 
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systems for control and command. These newer networks 
even if totally private will almost atypically run the TCP/IP 
range of protocols and supporting services for backbone 
and control. Many providers are as previously mentioned 
also replacing dedicated hard physical links to 
control/command interfaces with links that may actually 
travel on or rely upon open public networks such as the 
Internet for data transport, due to either telecommunications 
provider enforced changes, or due to financial pressure. Of 
greater risk is that some of these systems utilise open 
protocol wireless systems such as 2.4 GHz WiFi for these 
command and control functionalities. 
This paper will examine the threats to, and countermeasures 
for SCADA systems as a result of the decreasing use of 
proprietary protocols and equipment, and their move to 
open protocol based systems and the use of the Internet as a 
backbone. It should be noted that the hacker community is 
increasingly aware of SCADA networking issues, with 
serious exploits now being available in the Metasploit 
framework for use by anyone who can use a mouse and 
connect to the Internet.  
2 SCADA – Slowly Circling A  
Disaster Area
Unlike conventional Ethernet networks that run business 
enterprises, SCADA and control networks typically need to 
have consistent connection to devices that control industrial 
processes. SCADA and control systems work by receiving 
data from instruments or data points and also sending 
commands or instructions to devices. These instructions or 
data could be to check flow rates of toxic chemicals, or 
open valves or start pumps to avert overflow of a fluid 
storage facility. The system is set to poll or respond over a 
given interval of time back to a controller or master. A 
break in this polling as a result of a simple disruption of 
these monitored processes can in turn cause these systems 
to go into failsafe modes or implement shutdown 
procedures or worse fail. These procedures are designed to 
provide maximum safety for the particular process being 
run, and in some cases these shutdowns or failsafe 
procedures are mandated by regulation and law. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to assume that disruption or denial of 
service on a SCADA network could have catastrophic 
consequences and is a highly undesirable event in these 
systems. 
SCADA and control systems are one set of systems where it 
could be argued the use of open source or protocols 
significantly impacts the security of these systems, and a 
wide range of interconnected systems and critical 
infrastructures. There is little doubt there is significant 
value in secret knowledge or compartmentalisation of 
knowledge for critical systems otherwise we would all have 
access to nuclear missile launch codes.  
As mentioned previously SCADA and control systems are 
moving to open source/open community protocols such as 
DNP3, and away from other proprietary systems protocols. 
The logic behind having a common protocol and platform 
across these systems so that each platform or vendor 
devices can interact at a network or system level would be 
one that seems complete and one that makes good 
economic rational sense i.e. economies of scale, one 
protocol, one training provider etc. It could also be argued 
that it makes good technical sense as well to have a single 
unified environment with common hardware and software 
interacting. That is however, where any benefit stops, 
particularly from a security perspective. The use of like 
equipment can see an entire facility be vulnerable as part of 
a larger exposure in the equipments core. Cisco is without 
question the market leader in provision of network 
hardware and software, yet even it has system wide 
vulnerability that allowed complete compromise of a 
network that was using its equipment. Furthermore the use 
of a single platform in a network environment particularly 
for egress and ingress of network packets goes against a 
basic tenet of security, which is defence in depth. 
Common protocols have been proven to be problematic in 
networks, particularly if the flaw is patent and inherent in 
the design. Even closed or supposedly private networks that 
use wireless infrastructure are increasingly exposed as open 
to attack [5]. If we take WiFi or 802.11 equipment as a 
recent well known example, if the wireless equipment 
meets the IEEE standard for 802.11 it is regardless of 
manufacturer susceptible to a wide range of protocol based 
attacks [6, 7]. These protocol based attacks are 
devastatingly effective and unstoppable without further 
countermeasures or extension of the 802.11 protocol.  What 
could occur if DNP3 or ModBUS or a similar SCADA 
specific protocol was found to have the same level of 
exploit? 
Wireless based networks use a wide range of protocols and 
rates of transmission and some even use half duplex 
transmission to overcome low speed issues, but nonetheless 
the irrefutable fact is that they are transmitting across a 
commonly accessible media i.e. the atmosphere. This 
accessibility enables the transmissions susceptible to denial 
of service at a physical layer with wireless jamming devices 
[8]. The bad news is that this attack at the physical layer is 
almost impossible to defend against and can be hard to 
trace. These physical attacks are in addition to known 
exploits against particular wireless protocols which are 
numerous and well documented [6, 7, 9]. Even if the 
wireless communications use encryption or VPN 
technologies to protect transmission, there are numerous 
tools that can break, intercept or even inject into this type of 
network countermeasures [10] and the aforementioned 
physical attacks bypass these anyway. These vulnerabilities 
in wireless and associated transmission protocols are also 
not limited to WiFi or the 2.4 GHz spectrum simply 
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because they are radio based: they can also apply to other 
wireless frequencies and transmission protocols. 
The use of open source protocols is also problematic as 
many modern SCADA systems have http enabled 
management consoles and use either direct wired or 
wireless connectivity to achieve connection and you will 
have significant security problems already associated with 
normal network transport.  
SQL and database technologies are an invaluable tool for 
storing and retrieving data from appliances, and they are 
also widely used in configuration management for SCADA 
and control systems. They provide the ability to relay or 
receive commands, gather outputs or readings from various 
apparatus and store them for later use or processing, for 
example the generation of customer billing. The historian is 
an integral part of a SCADA or control system, and also 
replies upon these database technologies. The use of SQL 
systems all leave the window open for SQL injection and 
other exploit of database systems to occur as well in 
SCADA and control networks. Compromise and control of 
the SQL elements in a system can have catastrophic effects 
as was evinced in the 2003 SQL Slammer incursion into a 
nuclear power plant [11] . 
Even though SCADA has been flagged as a problem for at 
least the past 10 years, most commercial Ethernet centric 
firewalls and network security countermeasures are 
focussed on the resolution of problems with TCP/IP 
protocols and still largely ignore SCADA relevant protocols 
[12]. This hinders the development of enterprise initiatives 
as alternative products or 3rd party plugins must be adopted 
often with varying levels of integration and consequent 
success. 
A paper by [13] highlighted a range of security issues found 
in some of Australia’s critical infrastructure. These issues 
can be summarised as follows. 
General Issues: 
 Connection of SCADA to corporate networks 
 Governance 
 Policy 
 Physical Security 
IT Specific issues: 
 Un-patched hardware and software 
 Lack of network segregation and segmentation 
 Lack of sound authentication mechanisms 
 Lack of monitoring, logging and auditing 
Of concern here is that an examination of any report or 
document relating to SCADA security, or recommendations 
to secure SCADA lists most of the above as being areas that 
must be concentrated on (Stamp et al 2003; Fink et al 2006; 
Stouffer et al 2007). Furthermore, it should be noted that 
these documents have been freely available since at least 
2003.  
3 COUNTERMEASURES?
The typical countermeasures that are utilised for securing 
Ethernet networks apply to SCADA and control networks 
in theoretically the same way. These tools would include 
typically include a firewall, intrusion detection systems and 
some method of protocol analysis. There are however, 
subtle nuances in the way these would be utilised for 
instance it would be irresponsible to have an IDS halt/deny 
routes in SCADA/control network. 
Firewalls
Firewalls are a primary defensive mechanism for any 
network situation and through stateless or stateful 
inspection will allow or disallow egress of network packets 
through a gateway device or control point. Support for 
SCADA and control system protocols in commercial 
software is improving but the take up is slow (NISCC, 
2005, p.31). However, the open source community has 
developed a firewall for the ModBUS protocol that runs on 
Linux using extensions to the kernel netfilter firewalling 
(REF modbusfw). The filtering occurs on four header 
values these are:  
 Function code – filtering is based on single or 
multiple function codes 
 UnitID – filter on specified ID 
 Reference Number – filtering on a specified 
reference number 
 Length – Filter on size greater than, less than or equal 
too. 
This level of filtering allows for a reasonable degree of 
protection and ability to make rulesets that for instance 
would be able to trap buffer overflow attempts, incorrect or 
malformed commands, out of range packets or probative 
packets. This allows for a rich picture of network activity 
and any associated problems to be developed using 
appropriate analysis tools. 
Of course modern firewalls can have custom rule sets 
written and in fact some sources of these rulesets now exist 
for use. These rule sets however tend to suffer from one 
fatal flaw they are only as good as the person writing them 
and as robust as the person(s) testing them. Furthermore as 
these rule sets are often customised and run outside of the 
compiled or core firewall system they can have a significant 
performance impact on the firewall. Stateful packet 
inspection is a necessary and useful firewall technology that 
is becoming an almost default feature for TCP/IP based 
firewalls. There are still few firewalls capable of decoding 
SCADA protocols available, hence stateful packet 
inspection at this level can be at best problematic or at 
worst non-existent.  
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Intrusion Detection Systems 
There are commercial offerings that have limited support 
for intrusion detection on SCADA and control based 
protocols it should be noted that this is steadily increasing. 
Commercial and open source IDS has the ability to allow 
for the creation of custom rulesets. One of the supported 
ones available for SCADA comes from DigitalBond group 
and is designed mainly for Snort. The rulesets cover both 
DNP3 and ModBUS and cover buffer overflows, 
unauthorised commands and variety of other functions that 
need monitoring. These rulesets although rudimentary in 
nature provide a sound basis for building an IDS capability 
that deals with DNP3 and ModBUS protocol traffic in an 
enterprise network situation. Combined with other Snort 
utilities and extensions such as Snort Wireless, 
SnortReport, ACID or Base this type of system could 
provide valuable sight into the SCADA networks of an 
enterprise providing valuable feedback to network and 
security administrators. 
One of the conduits for SCADA and control systems 
control are wireless systems. The use of the for instance the 
Snort Wireless extensions from http://www.snort-
wireless.org provide some protections or at least warning 
that systems are being attacked. As [14] points out, the 
effectiveness of these systems in preventing attacks are 
limited but some protections or at least alerts are better than 
none. In the often quoted Maroochy Shire Council in 
Queensland [15] case of sewerage overflow the use of a 
simple wireless intrusion detection system could have 
resulted in early detection of the attacks.  
One method used by conventional IDS is also to deny 
routes automatically based on some preset threshold in a 
ruleset. This may be desirable for TCP/IP networks but is 
not desirable for SCADA due to failsafes activating any 
such ability in IDS should be turned off by default.  
All IDS allow for the capture of packets in a network 
stream to a file for later analysis. It is the authors contention 
that in an enterprise network at key junctures that there 
should always be a recording packet capture occurring 
preferably to a hard disk. This allows for the replay of 
incidents and more importantly the forensic analysis of 
what actually went wrong. This is particularly relevant in 
that the network borne exploit may not be a known and this 
one way of at least capturing it. 
Honeypot systems 
It is well documented in the literature that honeypot 
systems have proven their worth in being able to trap, 
contain or waste resources of persons or malcode with 
malicious intentions. Their purpose varies based on the 
intent of the deploying entity however, the common tenet is 
the emulation of a service/function within a network to 
effectively deceive the attacking entity that they are in fact 
attacking or probing a real system. 
There is an extension for the open source honeyd honeypot 
to provide emulation of PLC and SCADA technologies. 
The project files are a series of enhancement and additions 
to the existing honeyd architecture that enable mimicry of 
ModBUS and a PLC. The level of emulation is medium 
with OS fingerprints provided for a range of commonly 
available PLC devices plus supporting scripts to emulate 
the ModBUS protocol.  
This, like the Snort IDS rulesets, provides the basis for 
development of a sound, customised enterprise defensive 
approach. The scripts are customisable and allow an 
organisation to provide a customised and purpose designed 
system. The outputs from this type of system could be used 
to effectively detect inside malfeasance and also attempted 
penetration of systems from outside. It should be noted that 
the developers of the honeypot noted that the system would 
be best deployed near a real system but at the time of 
production were not aware of active and on-going attacks 
on SCADA systems [16]. There have been several other 
honeypot designs made for SCADA with DigitalBond [17] 
being one of them. 
Protocol Analysis 
One of the key diagnostic tools for any network 
administrator is the use of a protocol analysis tool that 
allows analysis of network traffic at the packet level. The 
open source tool Wireshark formerly known as Ethereal 
does filtering and decodes on DNP3, ModBUS TCP. This 
allows for network monitoring to occur even if the current 
firewalls and other countermeasures are currently 
insufficient in coverage and scope. The use of filters in 
Wireshark allows for the realtime monitoring of the 
enterprise network. For example monitoring could occur for 
the hex string 02040506090A0F12 which is an 
unauthorised write request to a PLC which could then 
generate an alert or log entry. True you could use an IDS 
for this but the use of Wireshark in this case is as a 
diagnostic tool. As previously mentioned the use of packet 
capture at key points in a network is a prudent choice. 
Wireshark is one such tool that is capable or capturing 
network streams to disk for later forensic investigation. 
4 Conclusion
There are problems with commercial systems not fulfilling 
or even supplying network countermeasures that are at least 
aware of SCADA or control system protocols. Open source 
solutions offer some partial remedy to the enterprise 
deployment of countermeasures and monitoring for 
SCADA systems. 
The use of Wireshark as a defensive mechanism within 
enterprise networks would currently allow for a highly 
granular approach to implementation of surveillance into 
SCADA based networks. This network intelligence in turn 
could be used to develop or extend IDS rulesets or the 
616 Int'l Conf. Security and Management |  SAM'09  |
honeypot to provide a robust and tailored solution for the 
particular enterprise.  
Firewalls are the primary and often only defence in a 
networked environment. They are primary filters of 
malcode and unauthorised transmission across a network 
interface. Yet support for stateful packet inspection and 
other technologies employed in conventional Ethernet 
based firewalls is still very much an immature technology 
in this space. 
As SCADA network protocols become more open and 
widely known the potential for exploits will also increase, 
ubiquity breeds vulnerability. Recent developments with 
existing penetration and testing tools being enhanced to 
target SCADA and control system vulnerabilities is of 
concern.  
Governments are starting to recognise the need for research 
to combat cyber attacks. However the focus of much of this 
research is looking at ameliorating threat in web services 
and end user products, there is not as of yet concentrated 
efforts on SCADA and control systems. This is an area that 
governments and others should be directing research 
energies into because if you do not have power, water or 
telecommunications whether your browser works or not is 
essentially a moot point.  
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